Iranian Hegemony in the Middle East

Since the attacks initiated by Hamas on Israel on October 7 and Israel’s retaliatory counteroffensive, the main question on the mind of many analysts and observers has been about the role of Iran in this conflict. Although Iranian authorities never spelled out clearly their role in the Gaza conflict, and the Hamas leaders have been very careful not to mention the Iranian role in the October 7 operation, it is very likely that Iran knew about Hamas’ plans. As a result, Iran washed its hands off  any support to Hamas and showed no willingness to fight for Palestinians in Gaza. It goes without saying that the Hamas attack was of no help to the Palestinian cause, and it created an anti-Israeli (not to say anti-Jewish) public sentiment in many of the Arab countries. As for Iran’s position toward the war in Gaza, it is clear that the Ayatollahs have benefited from the chaos in the Middle East to strengthen their hegemony in the Middle East.

Many analysts and observers of the Middle East would agree to say that the Iranian strategy of hegemony is reflected through its Shiite and revolutionary perception of the Middle East and particularly its meddling policies toward the neighboring countries. As such, the Iranian discourse, concerning various developments in the region clearly indicates that Iran considers itself as a model state, with a special task to create geopolitical changes in the Middle East. Since 1979 and the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran’s Supreme Leader and his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, have led a foreign policy in which Iran acts as the self-appointed leader of the world’s Shia Muslims and with a direct influence on Iraqi and Lebanese politics. As a result, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC’s extraterritorial mission has been to support Shiite Islamist movements around the Middle East. The IRGC relies upon its subordinate element, the Quds Force, which according to Ayatollah Khamenei has for mission to “establish popular Hezbollah cells all over the world.”

Iran’s response to regional challenges and opportunities in the aftermath of its war with Iraq involved an offensive and defensive strategy shaped by the creation of a network of proxies. This vast network of allies and proxies built and maintained by the Quds Force which was led by Qassem Soleimani after 1998. Soleimani kept a low profile for years while he strengthened Iran’s ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria’s Bashar Assad and Shia militia groups in Iraq. Under Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force vastly expanded its capabilities, becoming a significant influence in intelligence, financial, and political spheres beyond Iran’s borders. Tehran learned from its war with Saddam that it should avoid the high costs of undertaking conventional warfare. Therefore, the best solution was to develop a network of proxies: the Quds Force adopted a structure to enable operations in Afghanistan, Africa, Asia, Central Asia, Iraq, Lebanon, Latin America, and the Arabian Peninsula. It established approximately 20 militant training camps in Iran.

After 2003, Iran was convinced that the United States and Saudi Arabia would install a pliant Iraqi government, so it raced to fill the postwar vacuum. Its leverage with Shiite groups, which are Iraq’s largest demographic group, allowed it to influence Baghdad politics. Iran also managed the Shiite militias to control Iraqi streets and undermine the American-led occupation. Iran supported Hezbollah, the Shiite militia and political movement, which it had earlier cultivated to use against Israel. Hezbollah’s reliance on Iran is wide ranging and significant. Aside from weapons provision, the Iranian army and the IRGC Quds Force oversee Hezbollah’s force build-up and preparedness and training of commanders and fighters. The fighting in Syria served as a clear example of the enormous power Iran holds over Hezbollah. Soleimani had tight control over Hezbollah commanders, setting the strategic and operational priorities, and overseeing the allocation of resources and manpower.

The Arab Spring and the subsequent rise of Islamic State in 2014 in Iraq and Syria offered a new opportunity for Iran to push forward with its agenda in the region by forming and managing sectarian armed forces in both countries and beyond. Hezbollah played a key role in recapturing major cities and towns from Syrian rebels, including Homs and Aleppo. IRGC through Soleimani established Shi’ite brigades comprised of Afghan refugees and Pakistani Shi’ite to help tilt the ongoing Syrian civil war in favor of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian conflict served as a powerful test of Iran’s external military doctrine. Consequently, Donald Trump’s decision in January 2020 to approve the assassination of Qassem Soleimani was used as a source of new legitimacy for the IRGC in Iran and beyond. It gave a lifeline to the Iranian leadership and its allies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, by driving religious and nationalist sentiments and turning attention away from the failings of the Shiite leaders in Baghdad and Lebanon.

In the past few years, Israel and the US have been dealing heavily with most of Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Yemen. While the Houthis are no more in the position of winning totally the conflict in Yemen, the Lebanese Hezbollah will also have many difficulties to get the support of the non-Shiite Lebanese population if it enters a war with Israel. Therefore, it seems clear that despite its apparent posture to destroy the state of Israel, the Iranian leadership prefers that the current conflict remain limited to Gaza and not create any tensions with its other proxies. Clearly at this stage, Tehran does not support any widening of the fighting with Israel beyond Gaza. Yet, from Iran’s point of view, the damaged image of Netanyahu’s government could tie up Israel’s resources in its indirect confrontations with Iran. Let us not forget that although the situation in Gaza is highly important for the Iranian government, it is also critical for the Iranian regime to remain vigilant and ensure that the redline with Israel is not crossed. The Islamic Republic of Iran will remain a hegemonic force in the Middle East, but it also has to deal with many complexities and contradictions that are its Achilles heel.